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Much philosophical energy has been spent on demarcation questions – in 
philosophy of science, most notoriously, but also in philosophy of logic, and 
aesthetics. The question of how to demarcate science from pseudo-science, 
once regarded as central, commands relatively little attention today. In the 
philosophy of logic, by contrast, the problem of demarcating the logical 
constants is far less skeptically regarded. In aesthetics, where the problem is 
how to demarcate art from non-art, the question as to whether the problem is a 
real one or a pseudo-problem also continues to be debated. The hypothesis that 
the demarcation questions in these three areas are parallel, or at least similar 
enough to be interesting, is discussed. Some arguments for the conclusion that 
the demarcation problem is a pseudo-problem are considered, as are some 
demarcation proposals of a deflationist or minimalist sort. All are found 
wanting. 
It is not hard to imagine a philosopher saying something like this:  
 
‘While it is generally agreed that a, b, c, should count as art, and that 
d, e, and f should not, there is a vast disputed middle ground. Is g 
art? Are h, i, and j? What about k and l? In these border areas our 
intuitions from paradigm cases fail us; we need something more 
principled. However, there is little philosophical consensus about the 
basis for the distinction between art and non-art. Until this question 
is resolved, we lack a proper understanding of the scope and nature 
of art.’ 
 
Except for the last sentence, which raises a question that will be addressed 
below, and assuming sensible choices as to the values that a, b, c, etc. take, this 
seems a reasonable remark. In fact, though, the ‘quotation’ is based on the 
following (MacFarlane, 2009): 
 
‘While it is generally agreed that signs for negation, conjunction, 
disjunction, conditionality, and the first-order quantifiers should 
count as logical constants, and that words like ‘red’, ‘boy’, ‘taller’, 
and ‘Clinton’ should not, there is a vast disputed middle ground. Is 
the sign for identity a logical constant? Are tense and modal 
operators logical constants? What about ‘true’, the epsilon of set-
theoretic membership, the sign for mereological parthood, the 
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second-order quantifiers, or the quantifier ‘there are infinitely 
many’? Is there a distinctive logic of agency, or of knowledge? In 
these border areas our intuitions from paradigm cases fail us; we 
need something more principled…. However, there is little 
philosophical consensus about the basis for the distinction between 
logical and nonlogical expressions. Until this question is resolved, 
we lack a proper understanding of the scope and nature of logic.’ 
 
One can also imagine an actual philosopher saying this:  
 
‘There is no delineation of the sciences. We can at best list them. It is 
as if we could characterize the concept planet of the sun only by 
reciting: Mars, Venus, Earth, etc., and could not tell by any general 
principle whether the heavenly body epsilon is a planet or not. We 
have a laundry list of the sciences, but no characterization of what a 
science is – except a circular one….My focus will be the 
demarcation of science: What distinguishes science from the extra-
scientific?’ 
   
This too seems a reasonable remark.  As a matter of fact, though, it is not a 
real quotation.  But it is based on a real quotation from a well-known paper -- 
entitled ‘What is Logic?’ -- in which Hacking writes (Hacking 1979):  
 
‘But,  as  Tarski  had  earlier  implied,  there  is  no delineation  of the  
logical  constants. We can at best list them. It  is as  if  we  could  
characterize  the  concept  planet  of  the sun  only  by reciting Mars, 
Venus,  Earth,  etc.,  and could  not tell by  any  general principle 
whether  the  heavenly  body  epsilon  is a planet  or not. We have  a  
laundry  list  of  logical  constants,  but  no  characterization  of what  
a  logical  constant  is-except  the  circular  one,  that  logical constants  
are those  which  occur essentially  in analytic  truths.’ 
 
One could imagine a philosopher, in a similarly abstract spirit, saying this: 
 
‘Here is a standard enumeration of the F’s, from an influential text 
on the philosophy of F:  ‘a, b, c, etc.’  The ‘etc.’ of course helps not 
at all, since one is given no indication of what would count as a 
permissible addition to the list.’
 1
 
 
Is ‘F’ intelligibly replaced by ‘art’? ‘science’? ‘logical constant’? The 
sensible answer is: all three.  If it would not be unreasonable to say that each of 
the passages above could intelligibly have been written about art, or about 
                                               
1The ‘quotation’ is not real. But it is modeled on a remark by another influential philosopher of 
logic, Susan Haack, citing -- and    tacitly complaining about the limitations of -- Quine’s 
enumerative treatment of the logical constants.  Haack, Philosophy of Logics, p. 23.  
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science, or about logic, then it is worth considering the idea that there are 
significant similarities between the demarcation problems in aesthetics, 
philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic. If this is true, then we would 
expect to see similar arguments occur across those three domains. Moreover, as 
the quotations make clear, the idea that a laundry list constitutes an adequate 
answer to the demarcation question is not well regarded, at least among some 
well-respected philosophers of logic. If so, then laundry lists will, similarly, 
make for inadequate answers to demarcation questions in philosophy of science 
and in aesthetics.  
 
 
The Demarcation Problem and its alleged Demise – Laudan 
 
If it is granted, provisionally, that the demarcation question is importantly 
similar across philosophy of science, aesthetics, and philosophy of logic, it 
would be significant if it turned out to be a bad question. In an influential 
polemic, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,’ Laudan claims just that, 
concluding that (i) there are no epistemic features that all and only scientific 
disciplines share, and that (ii) the history of the attempts to demarcate science 
suggests that the quest for a demaracation device is not viable (Laudan 1983).
2
  
Laudan’s main argument amounts to this:   
 
1. Some scientific theories are well tested, others aren't;  
2. Some branches of science are presently showing high growth rates; 
others aren't. 
3. Some scientific theories have made many successful predictions of 
surprising phenomena; others haven't. 
4. Some scientific hypotheses are ad hoc; others aren't. 
5. So, there are no epistemic invariants across scientific activities/ 
beliefs/methods. (1 – 4) 
6. If there are epistemic invariants in science, then they consist in 
activities/beliefs/methods. (implicit) 
7. So, there are no epistemic invariants across science. (5, 6)  
8. Science can be demarcated from non-science by means of an 
epistemic demarcation criterion only if there exist epistemic 
invariants across science. (implicit) 
9. So, science can’t be epistemically demarcated from non-science. 
(7,8) 
10. The only possible demarcation criterion is an epistemic one. 
(implicit) 
11. So, there is no demarcation criterion. (9,10) 
 
                                               
2Laudan, (1983), ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,’ in Cohen, R.S.; Laudan, L., 
Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, Boston Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, 76, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, p. 118.  
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There are several problems here. One might wonder, first, how strong the 
inductive stage of the argument is, and whether Laudan would endorse its 
extension to other philosophical domains.
3
 Second, a narrow sense of 
‘epistemic invariant’ seems to be in play: Laudan assumes that only beliefs and 
activities and ‘modes of inquiry’ are reasonable candidates for epistemic 
invariants. It is unclear that this list is complete:  it might be thought that ideals 
and desires can be epistemic (and invariant). What licenses the assumption that 
the only possible demarcation criterion is an epistemic one, narrowly 
construed? Third, the meaning of Laudan’s conclusion is not obvious. It is 
highly implausible if taken to mean that there is no difference between science 
and non-science. In fact, probably Laudan means that there is no absolutely 
sharp distinction: he writes that an adequacy condition on any demarcation 
criterion is that is be precise enough to be used to tell whether ‘various beliefs 
and activities we are investigating do or do not satisfy it’; if not, Laudan says, 
then ‘it is no better than no criterion at all.’
4
 This is wrong, if it means that 
every candidate for a demarcation criterion that permits borderline cases should 
be rejected for that reason alone. On the contrary, given the ubiquity of 
vagueness, we should predict borderline cases. Failing to specify a sharp line 
doesn’t disqualify a candidate demarcation criterion. Rather, if a sharp line can 
be specified, that fact should make us skeptical about the reality of what is 
being classified.  
 
 
A Peircean Proposal 
 
An approach that rejects a number of Laudan’s central assumptions about 
the nature of science is Peirce’s. In one of his many meditations on the essence 
of science, Peirce claimed that science is a ‘mode of life’ 
 
‘whose single animating purpose is to find out the real truth, which 
pursues this purpose by a well-considered method, founded on 
thorough acquaintance with such scientific results already 
ascertained by others as may be available, and which seeks 
cooperation in the hope that truth may be found, if not by any of the 
actual inquirers, yet ultimately by those who come after them and 
shall make use of their results.  It makes no difference how imperfect 
a man’s knowledge may be, how mixed with error and prejudice; 
from the moment that he engages in an inquiry in the spirit 
described, that which occupies him is science.’   
                                               
3For the  same objection to  the inductive argument to the conclusion that the search for a 
demarcation criterion for art is doomed, see Robert Stecker’s ‘Is it Reasonable to Attempt to 
Define Art?’ in N. Carroll, Theories of Art (University of Wisconsin Press 2000).   
4Cf. Robert Pennock:  ‘Laudan’s entire critique of demarcation… expects a precise line that 
can unambigiously rule any possible theory in or out of science….’ Synthese (2011) 178:177–
206, p. 184.  
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Because he takes science to be a mode of life, Peirce remarks, it makes 
sense ‘to take as the unit science the scientific mode of life fit for an individual 
person.’ But, he continues, since science is ‘essentially a mode of life that 
seeks cooperation, the unit science must, apparently, be fit to be pursued by a 
number of inquirers.’
5
  
On this approach, the demarcation criterion, properly understood, concerns 
the nature of science as it is ideally incarnated in the way of life of the scientist.  
The way of life of a scientist as scientist is defined as a way of life governed by 
a purpose or ideal. What is most fundamental, and therefore what is to be 
demaracated is, not, contra Laudan, scientific content, or, even, though this is 
closer, scientific conduct. What is more fundamental than either of those is the 
ideal spirit, purpose, or aim of (ideal) scientific conduct.  (Under ‘content’ we 
should include method; more on this below.
6
) Peirce’s view is broadly 
deontological, even Kantian, not consequentialist: its primary focus is the 
agent/scientist’s motivation for acting, not the independent features of her 
action, among which are included its consequences. Science is on this view 
defined in terms of the ideal of the scientific way of life:  the disinterested, 
unselfish, whole-hearted pursuit of truth. And truth, and the love of and desire 
for it, is a metascientific norm. It is for Peirce, as for Kant, ‘a moral norm 
legislating for both the aim and the methodology of scientists as scientists’ 
(Sullivan 1989). For Peirce, as for Kant, pure practical reasoning is primary, 
and pure practical reason ‘best defends its own primacy by protecting the rights 
of science… moral reason has both the right and obligation to defend the 
scientific enterprise against dangers posed by political or religious ideologies 
[i.e., pseudoscience]’ (Sullivan 1989).   
Viewing the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science from this 
Peircean/deontological perspective has several significant implications. First, 
there is a clear parallel to art. The most influential twentieth century defender 
of an aesthetic answer to the demarcation problem in philosophy of art, 
Monroe Beardsley, defined a work of art as either an arrangement of 
conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked 
aesthetic character or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or 
type of arrangements that is typically intended to have this capacity (Beardsley 
1982). If a demarcation criterion that that makes aesthetic intentions primary is 
respectable in aesthetics, then a demarcation criterion that makes scientific 
motivation primary cannot be rejected out of hand as a reasonable strategy in 
philosophy of science.  
Second, in a discussion of the question of a demarcation question in logic -
- whether second-order logic is logic -- the philosopher of logic Stuart Shapiro 
(Shapiro 1989)remarks that ‘[t]o some extent, the issue comes down to what 
                                               
5Peirce, Collected Papers, (7.221) 
6A theory developed by a theorizer with false beliefs about methodology needn’t be 
unscientific. Nor need the theorizing be unscientific -- that too is a matter of the motivations of 
the theorizer. Conduct, whether informed by true beliefs about methodology or false ones, is 
scientific conduct if its motivation is scientific.  
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the purposes of logic are.’  That is, the idea that what matters to demarcation is 
purposes or ideals is not alien to philosophy of logic.  
Third, Peirce’s deontological approach explains something that should 
strike us as surprising -- the moralistically loaded language employed in 
demarcation debates. Why pseudoscience and not just non-science? If it is true 
that what is definitive of science is, most fundamentally, a mode of life 
animated by a moral ideal, then it is unsurprising that its adherents use such 
strong rhetoric. Again (to turn to logic): why did the most influential American 
logician of the twentieth century, Quine, introduce the striking term ‘deviant 
logics’, rather than speaking more neutrally of alternative logics?
7
 Peirce’s 
approach explains this rhetoric, and has, moreover, a corollary:  though the 
heavy-handed power politics that the scientific community employed against 
Lysenko and Velikovsky should be condemned, what motivated the 
suppression of their views may well have been moral outrage at the traducing 
of an ideal. 
 
 
Timeless Demarcation Criteria 
 
One consequence of Peirce’s view that he saw very clearly is that, 
especially in the very early stages of science -- but not only then -- there are 
borderline cases: 
 
‘If a man pursues a method which, although very bad, is the best that 
the state of intellectual development of his time or the state of the 
particular science he pursues would enable a man to take… we 
perhaps cannot call them scientific men, while perhaps we ought to 
do so…. They are, at any rate, entitled to an honorable place in the 
vestibule of science….For my part, if these men really had an 
effective rage to learn the very truth, and did what they did as the 
best way they knew, or could know, to find out, I could not bring 
myself to deny them the title [of scientist]. ‘
8
 
 
Part of this has recently been denied. For example, Hansson, noting that 
epistemic warrant varies across time, argues that the demarcation between 
science and pseudoscience cannot be ‘timeless,’ since if it were, it would be 
contradictory to label a standpoint as pseudoscience at one but not at another 
point in time: 
 
‘… after showing that creationism is in certain respects similar 
to some doctrines from the early 18th century, one author 
maintained that ‘if such an activity was describable as science 
                                               
7W. V. O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Harvard University Press, 1986), chapter 6. 
8Peirce, ‘On Science and Natural Classes,’ in The Essential Peirce, volume 2 (Indiana 
University Press), p. 131.  
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then, there is a cause for describing it as science now’ … This 
argument is based on a fundamental misconception of science. It 
is an essential feature of science that it strives for improvement 
through empirical testing, intellectual criticism, and the 
exploration of new terrain. A … theory cannot be scientific 
unless it relates adequately to this process of improvement. At a 
very minimum, this requires that well-founded rejections of 
previous scientific standpoints are accepted. The demarcation of 
science cannot be timeless, for the simple reason that science 
itself is not timeless.’
9
   
 
But consider the claim that the existence of a timeless demarcation 
criterion entails (given that the amount of evidence available to the community 
changes over time) that it is contradictory to say that a theory is science at one 
point and pseudoscience at another. Here is a very crude) timeless epistemic 
standard: (*) (x)(y) (if x is a time and y is a theory, then y is warranted at x iff y 
answers to the evidence available at x)  Suppose that the evidence is different 
at t and at t+1, and that theory T answers to all the evidence available at t but  
not to all the evidence available at t + 1. And suppose that a theory is scientific 
at a time iff it is warranted at that time iff it answers to the evidence available 
at the time. Suppose also that if a theory is not scientific, then it is 
pseudoscientific.  Does (*) entail that it is contradictory to say that T is 
warranted at time t and not at t + 1? No:  (*) entails that T is warranted at t and 
not warranted at t +1, but not that it is a contradiction (it isn’t).  Moreover, if it 
is true at t that T is warranted at t and not warranted at t + 1, then it is true at 
every time that T is warranted at t and not at t + 1. So, one might hold that a 
theory is (in the sense that matters, by courtesy, if one likes) scientific if there 
is at least one time at which it was warranted. And obviously, if (*) is a 
timeless demarcation standard, then so is (**) (x)(y)(If x is a time and y is a 
person, then if y at x had an effective rage to learn the very truth, and did what 
she did as the best way she knew, or could know, to find out, then y is a 
scientist at x).  
Hansson seems to hold, moreover, that the fact that science by nature 
strives for improvement implies that it is untrue that something remains 
scientific even though evidence that overturns it becomes available -- since 
striving for improvement requires that well-founded rejections of previous 
[empirically less well-attested] scientific standpoints are accepted. But there is 
a clear equivocation on ‘rejection’ here. If ‘well-founded rejection’ means 
well-founded disbelief, then striving for improvement clearly does require 
rejection. That is, it is rational to disbelieve an inferior theory. But if ‘rejection’ 
of a theory means to denial of scientific status to it, then the claim that the fact 
that science strives for improvement entails the acceptance of ‘well-founded 
rejections of previous scientific standpoints’ entails, absurdly, that only the 
final theory is scientific. For every theory prior to the final one is such that it 
                                               
9Hansson, Sven  (2009) 'Cutting the Gordian Knot of Demarcation', International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, 23: 3, 237 — 243, p. 239 
An Anthology of Philosophical Studies 
Volume 7 
 
184 
can be improved upon. Moreover, one can without inconsistency rationally 
disbelieve a theory, hold it to be scientific, and recognize that, because it 
successfully fulfills an intention to improve over its predecessors, it is a 
scientific theory.  
In fact, the gist of Hansson’s argument seems simple:  science is 
progressive; whatever has the property of being progressive changes over time; 
so, since what changes over time cannot be timelessly demarcated, science 
cannot be timelessly demarcated. The argument is significant, and  not just 
because it has a premise which implausibly rules out the possibility that 
something might be timelessly demarcated by means of a criterion according to 
which, at every time, change is definitive. It is significant because it closely 
resembles a very well-known argument from the philosophy of art, due to 
Morris Weitz, which lies close to the Wittgensteinian roots of many attacks on 
the project of demarcating or defining art.  According to Weitz, the application 
conditions of the concept of art can never be exhaustively enumerated, since 
new cases can always be envisaged or created by artists (Weitz 1956): 
 
‘The very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present 
changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure 
any set of defining properties. We can, of course, choose to close the 
concept. But to do this … is ludicrous since it forecloses on the very 
conditions of creativity in the arts.’  
 
Weitz argues, that is, that art is creative; that whatever has the property of 
being creative changes over time; and that, because whatever changes over 
time cannot be timelessly demarcated, art cannot be. So his and Hansson’s 
argument are very close relatives. Both move from a premise about the 
dynamic nature of the definiedum to a conclusion about the impossibility of 
demarcation: 
 
1. X is F. 
2. Whatever has F-ness changes over time. 
3. What changes over time cannot have a (timeless) set of defining 
properties. 
4. So, X cannot have a (timeless) set of defining properties.    
 
But if this is a bad argument in the art case, then – if the hypothesis of this 
paper is correct -- it is a bad argument in the science and logic cases. And 
Weitz’s argument has been almost universally rejected in philosophy of art 
(see, for example, Davies 1991, Carroll 1999, Meskin 2008, among many). 
After all, as often noted, it might be part of the definition of art that it involves 
an exercise of creativity -- which would obviously avoid the ‘foreclosing of 
creativity’ in the arts that Weitz feared.    
 
Demarcation, Definition, Art 
 
185 
Who Needs a Demarcation Criterion? 
 
At the outset, I noted that several prominent philosophers of logic have 
expressed strong dissatisfaction with list-like ‘demarcations’ of the logical 
constants, as failing to explain why what is on the list is on the list.  I turn now 
to a recent proposal about the demarcation of art, due to a prominent 
contemporary philosopher of art, Dominic Lopes. Lopes claims that the 
problem of demarcating art reduces to two problems: the problem of analyzing 
art’s constituent micro-categories (the art-forms), and the problem of analyzing 
what it is to be an art-form (Lopes 2008).  If those two problems were solved, 
according to Lopes, then a very thin definition of art – call it the Deflationistic 
Definition (DD) -- would suffice: (DD) Item x is a work of art if and only if x is 
a work in activity P, and P is one of the art-forms.  So Lopes holds what we 
may call the Adequacy of the Deflationist Definition thesis (ADD):  If we had 
accounts of the individual art-forms, and of what it is to be an art-form, then 
DD would be an adequate definition of art. 
But why accept ADD?  Why think that, given theories of the individual 
artforms and an account of what it is to be an art-forms, DD would be 
adequate? Because, Lopes holds, it can explain puzzling revolutionary works 
like Marcel Duchamp’s readymades, which at the time of their creation appear 
to be non-art. Here’s how: any reason to say that a work belonging to no extant 
art-form is an artwork is a reason to say that it pioneers a new art-form. Hence, 
every artwork belongs to some art-form or other. Hence, if we had an account 
of what it is to be an art-form, together with theories of all the individual art-
forms, no definition of art more substantive than DD would be needed.  If this 
proposal is on the right track, then it answers the question, If one wants to give 
an enumerative account of what it is to be an F, and the list will in the future 
be extended to new kinds of F’s,  how does putting an ‘etc.’ on the end of the 
list help?   
But in fact this proposal seems misguided. By hypothesis, entertaining the 
question of whether or not x belongs to a new artform requires grasping some 
reason for x’s being art. Moreover, an activity might be ruled out as an art-form 
on the grounds that no artworks belong to it. If so, determining whether a new 
practice is an art-form requires determining, first, that its elements are 
artworks. Art, therefore, seems conceptually prior to art-forms. Focusing on the 
individual art-forms doesn’t, therefore, avoid the need for a definition of art.  
Alternatively put: The philosophical buck can be passed from an account of the 
macro-category of art to micro-level accounts of the individual art-forms which 
are its realizers, plus an account of what it is to be an art-form, only if an 
account of what it is for an activity to be an art-form doesn’t require getting 
clear both on what it is to be art, and on what it is that makes an activity a 
form. But that is required. Compare trying to get clear on the nature of thought-
experiments, without separately analyzing both the thought component and the 
experiment component.  
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Nobody Needs a Theory of F? 
 
One might, to return to the abstract approach to demarcation issues with 
which this paper began, consider a generalized form of Lopes’ proposal. The 
aim is to demarcate the F’s from the pseudo/non-/deviant F’s. Lopes’ proposed 
deflationary proposal, viewed abstractly, comes to this:   
 
‘Nobody needs a theory of F. The problem of analyzing the macro-
category of F may be reduced to the problem of analyzing F’s 
constituent microcategories, the individual F’s, and the problem of 
analyzing what it is to be an F. If those two problems were solved, 
then a thin definition of F would suffice:  Item x is F if and only if x 
is a work in activity G, and G is one of F’s microcategories. And, if 
we had accounts of micro-categories of F, and of what it is to be an 
F, that thin definition would suffice.’  
 
It is obviously a straightforward matter to adapt this approach to the 
philosophy of science case, as well as the philosophy of logic case. Consider 
the former: Nobody needs a theory of science. For the problem of analyzing the 
macro-category of science may be reduced to two problems: the problem of 
analyzing science’s constituent micro-categories, the individual sciences and 
the problem of analyzing what it is to be an individual sciene. If those two 
problems were solved, then a very thin definition of science would be 
adequate: Item x is a science if and only if x is a work in activity P, and P is 
one of the individual sciences. And if we had accounts of the individual 
sciences, and of what it is to be a science, then that would be an adequate 
definition of science.   
But clearly, this approach won’t work for the philosophy of science case 
any more than it will for the art case, and for the same reason. Presumably, in 
order to know what it is to be a scientific discipline we need to know what it is 
to be scientific, and what it is to be a discipline. There are, after all, disciplines 
that are not scientific and scientific entities – methods, communicative 
practices -- that are not disciplines. But if we knew what it was to be scientific, 
there would be no demarcation problem to begin with. A mere enumeration of 
the existing sciences does not help at all, in the face of perplexity as to whether 
a controversial candidate belongs on the list. For parallel reasons, the proposal 
is no more plausible for the logic case.      
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Demarcation problems are not solved by laundry lists. Demarcation 
problems are not pseudo-problems. Light may be shed on demarcation 
problems by comparing them as they arise in philosophy of science, philosophy 
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of logic, and aesthetics. A Peircean/deontological approach is worth further 
investigation.  
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